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Abstract
The Kyoto Protocol marks a break-through in global warming mitigation policies as it
sets legally binding emissions targets for major emitting regions. However, realisation
of the Protocol depends on the clarification of several issues one of which is the
permissible scope of international emissions trading between signatory countries.
Unrestricted trade produces hot air when signatory countries whose Kyoto targets are
well above their business as usual emissions trade in larger amounts of “abundant”
emission rights. Concerns on hot air motivated proposals for caps on emissions trading
by the EU. These caps are strictly refused by the USA and other non-European
industrialized countries who want to exploit the full efficiency gains from trade. In this
paper we show that there are cooling down strategies which can reconcile both
positions. International permit trade provides enough efficiency gains to make all
signatory countries better off than without permit trade while mitigating hot air. In
other words, part of the efficiency gains from free trade could be used to pay for higher
abatement targets of signatory countries which assure the same environmental
effectiveness as compared to strictly domestic action or restricted permit trade.
JEL classifications: Q2, Q4, D58
Acknowledgement
Helpful comments were received by Thomas Osang and Marcus Stronzik. None of the views
expressed here should be attributed to any of our employers or research sponsors
Non-technical Summary
National parliaments of major emitting industrialized countries such as the USA, Japan,
Canada or the Russian Federation have put acceptance of the Kyoto Protocol under
condition that emissions trading among signatory countries can be used as a flexible
mechanism to meet national reduction targets. While this stipulation has a clear
efficiency rationale, opponents of emissions trading systems such as the EU refer to
potential loopholes. International trade in permit rights may lead to an effective
increase of global emissions when signatory countries whose baseline emissions are
below their Kyoto entitlements sell large amounts of their abundant emission rights.
This phenomenon has been referred to as hot air. It is particularly relevant for the
Russian Federation and Ukraine where projected emissions for the Kyoto budget period
are well below the assigned amount of emission rights due to the break-down of
domestic economies. In order to mitigate hot air, the EU and its associates stress the
principle of supplementarity and call for restrictive ceilings on the amount of tradable
emissions. However, these caps are strictly refused by the USA and other non-
European industrialized countries who want to exploit the full efficiency gains from
trade.
In this paper we show that there are cooling down strategies which can reconcile both
positions. International permit trade provides enough sufficiency gains to make all
abating countries better off than without permit trade while mitigating hot air. To put it
differently, part of the efficiency gains from free trade could be used to pay for higher
average abatement targets of signatory countries which assure the same environmental
effectiveness as under strictly domestic action or restricted trade.
11 Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol constitutes a milestone in global warming mitigation policies.  For
the first time, major emitting regions – the so-called Annex B countries - committed
themselves to legally binding quantified greenhouse gas emissions limitation and
reduction objectives. However, national parliaments of several Annex B countries –
joined within the so-called UMBRELLA group1 - have put acceptance of the Kyoto
Protocol under condition that emissions trading among signatory countries can be used
as a flexible mechanism to meet national reduction targets. This stipulation has a clear
economic rationale. Emissions trading allows to exploit differentials in marginal costs
of emissions reduction across countries which may significantly reduce the total costs
of meeting accumulated reduction targets as compared to strictly domestic policy
measures. Nevertheless, the scope and institutional design of tradable permit systems is
highly disputed among signatory parties. Opponents of emissions trading systems such
as the EU and its associates2 refer to potential loopholes. International trade in permit
rights may lead to an effective increase of global emissions when signatory countries
whose baseline emissions are below their Kyoto entitlements sell large amounts of their
abundant emission rights. This phenomenon has been referred to as hot air  (Herold
1998, Greenpeace 1998). It is particularly relevant for the Russian Federation and
Ukraine where projected emissions for the Kyoto budget period are well below the
assigned amount of emission rights due to the break-down of domestic economies.
In order to mitigate hot air, the EU and its associates stress the principle of
supplementarity and call for restrictive ceilings on the amount of tradable emissions
(Baron et al. 1999). 3 The UMBRELLA group on the other hand is not willing to forego
potential efficiency losses from trade restrictions and has already indicated strong
resistance to any ceiling plans. As the realization of the Kyoto Protocol depends
crucially on the ratification by the UMBRELLA group - in particular the US – a
solution to the hot air issue seems to be rather crucial for an effective climate protection
policy.
                                       
1 The key protagonists of  free emissions trading include the USA, Japan, Australia, Canada, Iceland,
New Zealand, Norway, Ukraine and the Russian Federation.
2 EU associates include Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia, Lettland, Switzerland, Slovenia, Poland
and Bulgaria.
3 Other critical aspects of emissions trading which we do not further discuss here include the
certification, verification and the monitoring of emission reduction as well as the establishment of
credible compliance mechanisms.
2In this paper we analyze alternative ways to mitigate hot air without giving up
efficiency gains from trade in emission rights. The key idea is that signatory countries
under a system of internationally tradable permits adopt more stringent emission
reduction targets as imposed by the Kyoto Protocol to offset hot air which is excluded
by strictly domestic abatement policies. We show that this strategy of cooling down hot
air provides a cost-effective, Pareto-superior solution to all signatory countries as
compared to abatement policies which partially or fully restrict international trade in
emission rights. Our quantitative analysis is based on a large-scale CGE model of the
world economy.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we provide some background
information on the post- Kyoto climate change policy discussions. In section 3 we lay
out the modeling framework and baseline parameterization. In section 4 we present our
scenarios and discuss the computational results. In section 5 we summarize and
conclude.
2 Policy Background
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC 1997) fixes legally binding quantified greenhouse gas emissions limitation
and reduction objectives (QELROs) for Annex B parties. On average Annex B parties
have committed themselves to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 5.2 % from 1990
levels in the budget period 2008 to 2012. Table 1 indicates the commitments  for the
industrialized countries or regions as represented in our modeling framework.
Table 1: Quantified Emissions Limits under the Kyoto Protocol (Baron et al. 1999)
Annex B country or region Commitments
(in % of  base year  emissions)
United States of America 93
Canada 94
European Union (incl. EU associates)    91.9
Japan  94
Former Soviet Union (Russian Federation and Ukraine) 100
Other OECD (Australia and New Zealand)   107.3
The developing countries have refused so far any abatement commitment, mainly
because they fear negative effects of emissions limitation on their economic
3development. Also, before committing themselves to reduction targets, they demand
primary action by the developed world with large historical emissions.
During the Kyoto conference the UMBRELLA group has declared agreement on
emissions trading as an indispensable element of any protocol. Due to their pressure
emissions trading between signatory countries is now one of the flexible mechanisms4
introduced by the Kyoto Protocol. The rules for emissions trading are vague, though,
and remain to be defined.5 With respect to the scope of tradable permits the Kyoto
Protocol states that any trading shall be “supplemental” to domestic action for the
purpose of meeting the obligations. The principle of supplementarity was inserted
mainly due to concerns of the European Union on hot air. Hot air increases the effective
emissions associated with the Kyoto Protocol as parties with actual emissions below
target levels can trade their abundant emission rights. This will be particularly relevant
for the Russian Federation and Ukraine where projected emissions are well below the
Kyoto entitlements as the consequence of a severe economic decline after
transformation to market economies.6 Estimates of hot air range between an amount of
500-650 million tons of CO2 which corresponds to 70-90% of the total Annex B
reduction commitment (Herold 1998).
In May 1999 the EU Council of Ministers issued a concrete proposal with restrictive
caps on the share of emissions reductions a country might obtain through the use of the
Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms (Baron et al. 1999). This proposal faces stiff
resistance, however, by the UMBRELLA group, in particular the USA, which prefer no
limits to emissions trading at all (Loy 1999). The policy background as described above
reveals the need for strategies that reconciles both positions, i. e. mitigate hot air but at
the same time exploit the efficiency gains from tradable emission permits. In our
simulations below we show that it is indeed possible to cool down hot air and
nevertheless make all signatory countries better off through emissions trading.
                                       
4 Other mechanisms of cooperative implementation include the clean development mechanism
(CDM) and joint implementation (JI).
5 Unresolved issues are, inter alia, the time when trading might start, the definition of participants
and gases that might be traded, the establishment of the rules and procedures for trading, the
institutional set-up and the regulations regarding monitoring, verification and ultimately
enforcement of the rules.
6 Another - moral - justification for supplementarity has been to limit the possibility for countries to
“buy themselves out” of their obligations. Clearly, this argument contradicts basic principles of
welfare economics.
43 Analytical Framework and Baseline Calibration
For our analysis we use a 7-sector, 11-region general equilibrium model of the world
economy. The choice of sectors captures key dimensions in the analysis of carbon
abatement such as differences in carbon intensities and the scope for substitutability
across energy goods and carbon-intensive non-energy goods. The regional aggregation
covers the Annex-B parties as well as major non-Annex-B regions which are central to
the greenhouse gas issue. Table 2 summarizes the sectors and regions incorporated in
our model. We provide an algebraic documentation of the model in the appendix.
Table 2: Overview of sectors and countries/regions (Data base: GTAP 4, McDougall 1997)
Sectors Regions
COL Coal USA United States
CRU Crude oil CAN Canada
GAS Natural  gas EUR Europe
ROP Refined oil  products JPN Japan
ELE Electricity OOE Other OECD (Australia and New Zealand)
EIS Energy-intensive sectors FSU Former Soviet Union
Y Manufactures and services CHN China
IND India
ASI Other Asia
MPC Mexico and OPEC
ROW Rest of World
The economic effects of the Kyoto Protocol depend crucially on the extent to which
QELROs bind the economies in the budget period. In other words, the magnitude and
distribution of costs associated with the implementation of future emission constraints
depend on the Business-as-Usual (BAU) projections for GDP, fuel prices, energy
efficiency improvements, etc. In our comparative-static framework we infer the BAU
structure of the model’s regions for 2010 using most recent projections on the
economic development. We then measure the costs of abatement relative to that
baseline. As a starting point for our forward projection we use the GTAP 4 database
(McDougall 1997) and OECD/IEA energy statistics (IEA 1996)  for 1995 which is the
most recent year for which a complete set of statistics is available. 7 We use the
reconciliated benchmark data for this year to calibrate parameters of the CES functional
                                       
7 See Babiker and Rutherford (1997) for the assembly and reconciliation of these data sources.
5forms from a given set of quantities and prices (given exogenous elasticities). In a
second step we do the forward calibration of the 1995 economies to 2010 incorporating
exogenous information by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE 1998) for GDP
growth, energy demand and future energy prices. The fossil fuel production functions
are finally calibrated to be consistent with exogenous  price elasticities of supply.
A typical shortcoming of the comparative-static approach is the rudimentary
representation how policy interference affects investment decisions. In our abatement
scenarios we keep investment at the BAU level and ignore potentially important
impacts of carbon abatement on the level and pattern of investment across countries.
Our analytical framework provides rather conservative estimates of the cost of
abatement because we would expect that carbon emission limits will reduce the return
to capital and result in lower overall investment and GDP growth (see e.g. Böhringer
and Rutherford 1999a).
4 Policy Scenarios and Numerical Results
4.1 Policy Scenarios
The two initial simulations address the question to what extent international permit
trade between Annex B countries produces hot air as compared to strictly domestic
abatement:
(NTR) Annex B countries can trade emission rights as allocated by the Kyoto
Protocol only within domestic borders. There is no international trade in
permit rights.
(HOT) Emissions trading among Annex B countries assures that the Kyoto targets
are met in a more cost efficient way than with NTR. However, permit trade
produces higher emission levels (hot air) when countries that do not make
full use of their emission budget under NTR sell off abundant emission
rights in the international market.
We then investigate the efficiency implications of two alternative strategies that
achieve the same global emission level as NTR while allowing for unrestricted trade in
permits. We endogenously adjust emissions of OECD regions (USA, CAN, EUR, JPN,
OOE) to keep global emission equal to the NTR emission level. This means that OECD
countries commit themselves to the global emission target associated with NTR rather
than just complying with specific Kyoto targets. We distinguish two variants for
6endogenously scaling OECD emissions entitlements8 to cool down hot air emerging
from permit trade:
(UNI_NTR) QELROs of OECD countries are uniformly scaled across OECD
countries to assure that global emissions do not exceed the NTR
emission level.
(EQU_NTR) QELROs of OECD countries are endogenously scaled (i) to assure
that the NTR emission level is kept, and (ii) to equalize the welfare
gains from permit trade across OECD countries in percentage
Hicksian equivalent variation of NTR income.
How does the endogenous benefit sharing rule work? We cardinalize utility based on a
homothetic separable social welfare function å=
r
rWW where rW  is the welfare index
of region r. The welfare impact on region r is measured by changes in  )1/(1 rr -= -rr UW
where the parameter r reflects the degree of aversion to inequality in utilities and rU  is
a linearly homogeneous consumption welfare index (Atkinson 1970, Boadway and
Bruce 1984, Layard and Walters 1978). In the simulations with endogenous benefit
sharing we impose that
OECD
rr WWW D=---
-- )1/()1/(
11 rr
rr
and determine allocations of emission rights for OECD countries endogenously such
that the efficiency gains from trade are shared “equally” across trading partners.  rW is
the reference welfare level of region r for the NTR reference scenario. We set r equal to
1 which implies that efficiency gains from trade for the OECD country group are
distributed to equalize the percentage Hicksian equivalent variation in income of
OECD countries with respect to their NTR income levels.9
The final set of three policy simulations deals with the EU proposal for emission
ceilings. First, we investigate the efficiency and emission implications of caps on
permit trade as suggested by the EU Council of Environment (Baron et al. 1999):
                                       
8 The alternative assumption is to include also the Former Soviet Union into the scaling mechanism
(see Table 5).
9 Note that when r = 1,Wr takes on the form ln Ur .
7(CAP) Purchases or sales of emissions by Annex B countries may not
exceed 5 percent of the weighted average of base year emissions and
the assigned Kyoto emission budget.
We then quantify the potential efficiency gains from full trade while achieving the
same level of global emissions as with CAP using our two alternative scaling
procedures:
(UNI_CAP) QELROs of OECD countries are uniformly scaled across OECD
countries to assure that global emissions do not exceed the CAP
emission level.
(EQU_CAP) QELROs of OECD countries are endogenously scaled  (i) to assure
that the CAP emission level is kept, and (ii) to equalize the welfare
gains from permit trade across OECD countries in percentage
Hicksian equivalent variation of CAP income.
Our comparative-static model measures the costs of implementing Kyoto as compared
to a Business-as-Usual reference point (BAU) in 2010 where no abatement
requirements exist.
For all abatement simulations we assume that revenues from permit sales accrue lump-
sum to the representative agent in each region. In our exposition of results marginal
abatement costs can be interpreted as the price of emission permits which are either
traded domestically (NTR) or internationally (other cases).
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Emission Reduction Requirements and Marginal Abatement Costs under
NTR
To understand the potential for efficiency gains from permit trade we first investigate
the differences in marginal abatement costs across Annex B countries for the scenario
NTR where permits are not tradable at the international level. Table 3 reports the
marginal abatement costs associated with the implementation of the Kyoto targets
through strictly domestic action. There are large differences in marginal abatement
costs across Annex B countries indicating substantial efficiency gains from permit
trade. Marginal abatement costs range between zero for FSU and  82$US per metric ton
of CO2 for JPN. The magnitude of marginal costs depends inter alia on the level of
abatement. The further out we are on the abatement cost curve the more costly it gets –
8ceteris paribus - to substitute away from carbon in production and consumption. Table
3 summarizes the abatement levels for the various Annex B countries. Note that the
Kyoto targets which appear modest with respect to 1990 emission levels translate into
much higher effective cutback  requirements for OECD countries with respect to their
BAU emission levels in 2010. OOE, for example, is allowed to increase emissions by
7% over 1990 levels under the Kyoto Protocol; nevertheless, this implies an obligatory
decrease of more than 15% in its BAU emissions by 2010. Apart from the abatement
level the marginal abatement costs depend on differences in carbon intensity for
different sectors across countries. These differences explain for example why JPN faces
much higher marginal abatement costs as compared to USA in order to achieve an
almost identical relative cutback of carbon emissions. JPN uses relatively little carbon
in sectors with low-cost substitution possibilities, in particular electricity generation
(due to nuclear power). As a consequence JPN has to cut back relatively more
emissions in other sectors such as traffic where abatement comes more costly.
Table 3: Effective emission cutback requirements and marginal abatement costs in 2010
Cutback requirement* Marginal abatement costs**
CAN   27.48 62.65
EUR   10.72 19.02
JPN   25.99 81.65
OOE   15.63 20.41
USA   27.47 43.55
FSU -48.33 -
*  in % from BAU
**in $US per ton of CO2
Table 3 also reveals that FSU is far off from facing a binding carbon constraint. While
FSU has committed to stabilize its emissions in the budget period at 1990 emission
levels, its BAU emissions in 2010 are far below the Kyoto target.  The main reason for
the drop in emissions below 1990 levels is the decline in economic activity (particularly
in emission-intensive industries) after the transformation of FSU to market economies.
Having no abatement costs at all under NTR we can safely project that FSU will be a
seller of permit rights in a tradable permit system for Annex B countries.
4.2.2 Unrestricted Trade in Permits: Efficiency Gains, Hot Air and Cooling Down
Strategies
Table 4 summarizes the changes in key economic indicators when we move from the
NTR to policies which allow for unrestricted trade in permits among Annex B
countries.
9Table 4: Environmental and economic implications of alternative abatement strategies
BAU NTR HOT UNI_NTR EQU_NTR
A. Global emissions (in billion tons of CO2)
30,19 28,51 29,03 28,51 28,51
B. Welfare changes (in %HEV of BAU income)
OECD - -0,24 -0,11 -0,22 -0,21
ANNEX B - -0,25 -0,04 -0,09 -0,09
NON ANNEX B - -0,08 -0,05 -0,06 -0,06
GLOBAL - -0,20 -0,04 -0,08 -0,08
CAN - -0,87 -0,45 -0,76 -0,85
EUR - -0,01 -0,03 -0,08 0,01
JPN - -0,30 -0,05 -0,11 -0,28
OOE - -0,65 -0,38 -0,61 -0,63
USA - -0,40 -0,21 -0,37 -0,38
FSU - -0,99 4,08 6,82 6,82
ASI - 0,13 0,08 0,13 0,12
CHN - 0,20 0,07 0,11 0,11
IND - 0,27 0,11 0,17 0,17
MPC - -0,94 -0,46 -0,68 -0,68
ROW - -0,01 -0,01 -0,01 -
C. Marginal abatement costs (in $US per ton of CO2)
CAN - 62,65 12,6 19,97 19,98
EUR - 19,02 12,6 19,97 19,98
JPN - 81,65 12,6 19,97 19,98
OOE - 20,41 12,6 19,97 19,98
USA - 43,55 12,6 19,97 19,98
FSU - - 12,6 19,97 19,98
D. Effective cut back requirement (wrt to 1990 emissions levels)
CAN - 0,94 0,94 0,87 0,81
EUR - 0,92 0,92 0,85 0,96
JPN - 0,94 0,94 0,87 0,52
OOE - 1,07 1,07 1,00 0,98
USA - 0,93 0,93 0,86 0,86
FSU - 1,00 1,00 0,93 1,00
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First of all, we see that Annex B trade in permits produces hot air with global carbon
emissions increasing by 489 million tons of CO2 as compared to NTR (see the
difference between global emissions under NTR and HOT in Table 4A.). FSU sells a
large amount of its formerly abundant emission rights and takes over domestic
abatement. The pattern of permit trade is determined by the location of marginal
abatement costs under NTR with respect to the equalized marginal abatement costs for
tradable permits. Countries whose marginal abatement costs under NTR are below the
uniform permit price will sell permits and abate more emissions. In turn, countries
whose marginal abatement costs are above the uniform permit price rate will buy
permits and abate less emissions. FSU is the sole seller of permit rights under HOT
whereas the other Annex B countries are buyers. Nearly all Annex B countries benefit
substantially from trade in permits. The one exception is EUR whose small welfare
losses under NTR increase slightly due to negative terms of trade effects. The overall
efficiency gains from permit trade are the composition of gains from equalized
marginal abatement costs through trade and from a relaxation of the global emission
constraint due to hot air. To measure the gains from international trade in permits as
compared to the NTR scenario properly we have to fix the environmental target, i.e.
global emission, at the NTR level.  We do this in scenarios EQU_NTR and UNI_NTR
where we endogenously scale the permit allocations of OECD countries to meet the
NTR global emission level.
Efficiency gains from international trade provide the rationale for cooling down
strategies: On average OECD countries should be willing to accept stricter abatement
targets to mitigate hot air because they will nevertheless do significantly better than
under NTR. However, at the single country level this general proposition might not
work out due to negative terms of trade effects (see e.g. EUR in Table 4B.). We may
have to scale permit allocations in a differentiated way to produce a Pareto-superior
outcome for all trading partners. Scenario EQU_NTR reports such a scaling which
assures that all OECD countries benefit equally in terms of  HEV with respect to NTR.
Cooling down hot air further increase the welfare gains for FSU which are already
substantial under HOT. Permit prices under UNI_NTR and EQU_NTR go up implying
larger revenues from permit sales for FSU.
The magnitude of benefits from trade for OECD countries and FSU will change
significantly depending on whether FSU is included in the trade-for-higher-targets deal
or not. If FSU is included, a major part of  its gains from permit sales will be re-
distributed among OECD countries (see Table 5).
We see that abatement policies in the developed world produces non-negligible spill-
overs to non-abating developing countries. In our static framework emission constraints
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for Annex B countries improve welfare for most developing countries except for fossil
fuel exporters MPC and ROW. Secondary welfare changes in developing countries are
directly related  to terms of trade effects, i. e. changes in international market prices.10
Table 5: Environmental and economic implications of alternative abatement strategies
Welfare* Marginal costs** Abatement***
CAN -0,69 19,77 0,92
EUR   0,17 19,77 1,13
JPN -0,12 19,77 0,83
OOE -0,47 19,77 1,09
USA -0,21 19,77 0,98
FSU -0,81 19,77 0,51
ASI   0,13 - -
CHN   0,12 - -
IND   0,18 - -
MPC -0,76 - -
ROW -0,02 - -
* in HEV of BAU income
** in $US per ton of CO2
*** with respect to 1990 emission levels
The fall in fossil fuel prices due to reduced demands plays a major role for the
magnitude and the sign of  welfare changes from terms of trade effects. Regions which
are net importers of fossil fuels gain, whereas regions which export fossil fuels loose.
In non-fossil fuel markets, where traded goods are differentiated by origin, developed
countries are able to pass on part of their domestic abatement costs to non-abating
developing countries. Apart from higher export prices of developed countries,
developing countries might suffer from a scale effect as economic activity and hence
import demand by developed countries decline. On the other hand, there is an opposite
substitution effect as developing countries may gain market shares in import demand of
trading partners because their exports become more competitive as compared to abating
                                       
10 Böhringer and Rutherford (1999b) present a decomposition method that allows to separate terms of
trade effects on different markets.
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Annex B countries. Trade in permits appears to be welfare decreasing for most of the
developing countries (except for MPC). The results that (i) abatement in Annex B
countries produces welfare gains for most developing countries, and (ii) Annex B
permit trade decreases those gains for most developing countries should be noted with
some caution. Dynamic analysis (see e. g. Böhringer and  Rutherford 1999a) which
accounts for the negative impact of abatement on investment and hence future capital
stocks, i.e. future consumption possibilities, indicates that welfare losses from
abatement in developed countries are potentially underestimated in our static
framework. As a consequence the negative spill-overs through international markets
may dominate the positive spill-overs for developing countries reversing some of our
qualitative results.
4.2.3 The EU Proposal: Caps on Trade
Apart from the questionable attempt to limit the “buy themselves out” possibilities for
Annex B countries the EU proposal for caps on permit sales and purchases aims
primarily at mitigating hot air. As can be seen from Table 6 the EU proposal in fact
reduces hot air substantially.
However, the ceilings imply a loss in economic efficiency as one can not exploit lower
cost abatement options across Annex B countries to the full extent possible. To
materialize the efficiency gains associated with the EU proposal we apply once again
our cooling down strategies taking the effective global emissions under CAP as the
reference target. Achieving the same level of environmental quality, i. e. emissions,  as
under CAP the efficiency losses of cooling down strategies is significantly below the
loss from CAP.
5 Conclusions
Only recently, the EU and associated partners have proposed caps on emissions trading
to mitigate hot air. These caps are strictly refused on behalf of the USA and other
members of the so-called UMBRELLA group who want to exploit the full efficiency
gains from trade.
In this paper we have shown that there are cooling down strategies which can reconcile
both positions. International permit trade provides enough sufficiency gains to make all
Annex B countries better off than without permit trade while mitigating hot air. To put
it differently, part of the efficiency gains from free trade could be used to pay for higher
average abatement targets of signatory countries which assure the same environmental
effectiveness as under strictly domestic action (NTR) or restricted trade (CAP).
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Table 6: Environmental and economic implications of EU cap strategy
NTR HOT CAP UNI_CAP EQU_CAP
A. Global emissions (in billion tons of CO2)
28,51 29,03 28,74 28,74 28,74
B. Welfare changes (in %HEV of BAU income)
OECD -0,24 -0,11 -0,20 -0,16 -0,16
ANNEX B -0,25 -0,04 -0,17 -0,06 -0,06
NON ANNEX B -0,08 -0,05 -0,07 -0,06 -0,06
GLOBAL -0,20 -0,04 -0,15 -0,06 -0,06
CAN -0,87 -0,45 -0,72 -0,61 -0,68
EUR -0,01 -0,03 -0,03 -0,05 0.01
JPN -0,30 -0,05 -0,17 -0,08 -0,13
OOE -0,65 -0,38 -0,58 -0,50 -0,54
USA -0,40 -0,21 -0,36 -0,30 -0,32
FSU -0,99 4,08 1,31 5,52 5,52
ASI 0,13 0,08 0,11 0,11 0,11
CHN 0,20 0,07 0,15 0,09 0,09
IND 0,27 0,11 0,21 0,14 0,14
MPC -0,94 -0,46 -0,74 -0,58 -0,58
ROW -0,01 -0,01 -0,02 -0,01 -0,01
C. Marginal abatement costs (in $US per ton of CO2)
CAN 62,65 12,6 38,90 16,54 16,55
EUR 19,02 12,6 27,86 16,54 16,55
JPN 81,65 12,6 45,18 16,54 16,55
OOE 20,41 12,6 27,86 16,54 16,55
USA 43,55 12,6 27,86 16,54 16,55
FSU 12,6 16,54 16,55
D. Effective cut back requirement (wrt to 1990 emissions levels)
CAN 0,94 0,94 0,94 0,90 0,85
EUR 0,92 0,92 0,92 0,88 0,96
JPN 0,94 0,94 0,94 0,90 0,77
OOE 1,07 1,07 1,07 1,03 0,99
USA 0,93 0,93 0,93 0,89 0,87
FSU 1,00 1,00 1,00 0,96 1,00
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Abstracting from lump-sum transfers we have determined initial permit allocations
which imply an equitable sharing of efficiency gains across signatory countries.
Of course, our quantitative results will depend crucially on our baseline projections
which determine the magnitude of hot air. When GDP (emission) projections for FSU
are higher than in our baseline scenario, hot air in the context of the Kyoto Protocol
becomes less important.
Yet, beyond the current debate on hot air under the Kyoto Protocol, it should be noted
that more generally hot air is a problem of defining proper baselines. When regions
negotiate emission baseline that lie beyond their credibly projected emissions, these
regions are primary candidates for producing hot air in tradable permit systems.
Obviously, the prospects for trade in permits provides a strong incentive for countries
to overstate expected emissions. At the global level this entails the risk of driving up
the world-wide emission level. In essence, the debate on hot air or baseline projections
then boils down to the central issue of burden sharing. However, as indicated by our
simulations, accepting exaggerated claims for emission rights and trying to avoid hot
air through caps in trade may trigger significant efficiency losses. The world
community will do much better to search for fair initial allocations of permits rights
based on credible emissions projections and allow for free permit trade. The latter
reduces the costs of emission abatement at the global level, while the former addresses
the question how costs (cost savings) should be divided up. Our quantitative analysis of
post-Kyoto abatement strategies provides hence an illustrative example of issues that
are likely to play themselves out at the global level in the future when developing
countries will have also to adopt emission constraints.
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Algebraic Appendix
This appendix provides an algebraic summary of the equilibrium conditions for our
comparative-static model designed to investigate the economic implications of the
Kyoto Protocol in 2010 as compared to a Business-as-Usual economic development
where no carbon abatement policies apply. Before presenting the algebraic exposition
we state our main assumptions and introduce the notation.
Nested separable constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions characterize the use
of inputs in production. All production exhibits non-increasing returns to scale. Goods
are produced with capital, labor, energy and material (KLEM).
A representative agent (RA) in each region is endowed with three primary factors:
natural resources (used for fossil fuel production), labor and capital. The RA maximizes
utility from consumption of an CES composite which combines demands for energy
and non-energy commodities. Supplies of labor, capital and natural resources are
exogenous. Labor and capital are mobile within domestic borders but cannot move
between regions; natural resources are sector specific.
All goods, except for coal and crude oil, are differentiated by region of origin. Constant
elasticity of transformation functions (CET) characterize the differentiation of
production between production for the domestic markets and the export markets.
Regarding imports, nested CES functions characterize the choice between imported and
domestic varieties of the same good (Armington). Crude oil and coal are imported and
exported as homogeneous products.
Lump sum transfers of the RA finance the exogenous government demands in each
regions and the government transfers all revenues from carbon permits to the RA.
Two classes of conditions characterize the competitive equilibrium for our model: zero
profit conditions and market clearance conditions. The former class determines activity
levels and the latter determine price levels. In our algebraic exposition, the notation zirP
is used to denote the profit function of sector j in region r where z is the name assigned
to the associated production activity. Differentiating  the profit function with respect to
input and output prices provides compensated demand and supply coefficients
(Shepard’s lemma), which appear subsequently in the market clearance conditions. We
use i (aliased with  j) as index for commodities (sectors), r (aliased with  s) as index for
regions and d as index for the demand category (d=Y: intermediate demand, d=C:
private household demand, d=G: investment demand, d=I: investment demand). The
label EG represents the set of energy goods and the label FF denotes the subset of fossil
17
fuels. Tables A.1 – A.6 explain the notations for variables and parameters employed
within our algebraic exposition.
A.1 Zero Profit Conditions
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2. Production of fossil fuels:
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3. Sector-specific energy aggregate:
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4. Armington aggregate:
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5. Aggregate imports across import regions:
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6. Investment:
0=åP p - p = AIirIir
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7. Public good production:
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0
1
=÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
úû
ù
êë
é Õ
Ï
P
sss g
qq
ECECirEC
-1-1
EGi
A
Cir
E
Cr
E
Cr
-1E
Cr
C
r
C
r
 )p)-(1 + p - p = 
9. Household energy demand:
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A.2 Market Clearance Conditions
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12. Natural resources:
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18. Household consumption:
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19. Aggregate household energy consumption:
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Table A.1: Sets
i Sectors and goods
j Aliased with i
r Regions
s Aliased with r
EG All energy goods: Coal, crude oil, refined oil, gas and electricity
FF Primary fossil fuels: Coal, crude oil and gas
LQ Liquid fuels: Crude oil, refined oil and gas
d Demand categories: Y = intermediate, C = household and I = investment
Table A.2: Activity variables
irY Production in sector i and region r
irE Aggregate energy input in sector i and region r
irM Aggregate imports of good i and region r
dirA Armington aggregate for demand category d of good i in region r
rI Aggregate investment in region r
rG Aggregate public output in region r
rC Aggregate household consumption in region r
CrE Aggregate household energy consumption in region r
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Table A.3: Price variables
pir Output price of good i produced in region r for domestic market
X
irp Price of aggregate energy in sector i and region r
pEir Price of aggregate energy in sector i and region r
pMir Import price aggregate for good i imported to region r
p Adir Price of Armington aggregate for demand category d of good i in region r
pIr Price of investment demand in region r
pGr Price of government demand in region r
pCr Price of aggregate household consumption in region r
pECr Price of aggregate household energy consumption in region r
rw Wage rate in region r
rv Price of capital services in region r
irq Rent to natural resources in region r (i Î FF)
2CO
rt Price of CO2 permit in region r
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Table A.4: Cost shares
X
irq Share of exports in sector i and region r
jirq Share of  intermediate good j in sector i and region r (iÏFF)
KLE
irq Share of KLE aggregate in sector i and region r (iÏFF)
E
irq Share of energy in the KLE aggregate of sector i and region r (iÏFF)
T
ira Share of labor (T=L) or capital (T=K) in sector i and region r (iÏFF)
Q
irq Share of natural resources in sector i of region r (iÎFF)
FF
Tirq Share of good i (T=i) or labor (T=L) or capital (T=K) in sector i and
region r (iÎFF)
q COAir Share of coal in energy demand by sector i in region r (iÏFF)
q ELEir Share of electricity in non-coal energy demand by sector i in region r
jirb Share of fossil fuel j in energy demand by sector i in region r (iÏFF,
jÎLQ)
q Misr Share of imports of good i from region s to region r
q Adir Share of domestic variety i  in Armington aggregate for demand category
d  in region r
q Iir Share of good i in investment for region r
q Gr Share of good i in government demand in region r
q ECr Share of energy in aggregate household consumption in region r
irg Share of non-energy good i in non-energy household consumption
demand in region r
q E rCELE ,, Share of electricity in aggregate household energy consumption in region
r
q EiCr Share of non-electric energy good i in the non-electric household energy
consumption in region r
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Table A.5: Endowments and emissions coefficients
Lr Aggregate labor endowment for region r
rK Aggregate capital endowment for region r
irQ Endowment of natural resource i for region r (iÎFF)
rG Aggregate government demand in region r
I r Aggregate investment demand in region r
Br Balance of payment surplus in region r (note: 0=å
r
rB )
2CO r Endowment of carbon emission rights in region r
carb
dira Carbon emissions coefficient for fossil fuel i (iÎFF) in demand category d
of region r
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Table A.6: Elasticities
h Transformation between production for the domestic
market and production for the export
4
KLEs Substitution between energy and value-added in
production (except fossil fuels)
0.3
FFs Substitution between natural resources and other inputs
in fossil fuel production calibrated consistently to
exogenous supply elasticities FFm .
mCOA=0.5
mCRU=1.0
mGAS  =1.0
COAs Substitution between coal and the non-coal energy in
production (except fossil fuels)
0.5
ELEs Substitution between electricity and the non-coal fossil
fuels in production (except fossil fuels)
0.3
Ms Substitution between imports from different regions 8
As Substitution between the import aggregate and the
domestic input
4
CELE,s Substitution between electricity and the non-electric
energy in household energy consumption
0.3
NELEs Substitution between non-electric 0.5
